This article uses life insurance data to estimate the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion for each of nearly 2,400 households. Attitudinal differences toward pure risk are then examined across demographic subgroups. Additionally, differences in speculative risk-taking are examined across demographic groups based on survey responses and compared with the results on pure risk aversion.
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1960s, John Pratt and Kenneth Arrow introduced the now-familiar measure of relative risk aversion, along with the hypothesis that relative risk aversion increases with wealth. Since that time, numerous researchers have attempted to estimate the magnitude of relative risk aversion for subsets of the population using a variety of techniques, and others have conducted empirical tests of the increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) hypothesis. Most recently, attention has turned to comparing risk aversion across different demographic subgroups, particularly men and women. 1 Remarkably, these efforts have been largely independent of one another. Some of those seeking to estimate risk aversion parameters, for example, assumed a utility function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), effectively precluding tests of the IRRA hypothesis. On the other hand, most studies examining the relationship between risk aversion and demographic or wealth variables infer differences in risk aversion parameters rather than calculating the parameters explicitly. Many use either hypothetical questions or experimental gambling data, and most restrict attention to forms of risk in which both gains and losses are possible.
In the present study, the authors integrate and extend these three strands of research. First, the authors derive a reduced form equation for the Pratt-Arrow measure of relative risk aversion without imposing prior assumptions on the shape of the utility function. The authors then estimate the risk aversion parameter empirically for indiMartin Halek is a doctoral candidate in insurance and risk management at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Joseph Eisenhauer is professor of economics at Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y. The authors thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments; any errors are the authors'. 1 Throughout this article, "risk aversion" refers to Arrow's (1965) concept of relative risk aversion, which is discussed in more detail below.
vidual households using survey data on life insurance purchases. This gives us more than 2,300 numerical measurements of the Pratt-Arrow coefficient. These measurements are then used to examine differences in relative risk aversion across demographic groups based on age, gender, education, nationality, race, marital and parental status, religion, health and behavioral indicators, and employment status, income, and wealth. The availability of wealth data also allows us to test the IRRA hypothesis. Finally, the authors examine attitudes toward a second type of risk, by studying survey responses to a hypothetical question regarding employment and income risk.
The first section briefly reviews the prior research. The second and third sections present the authors' theoretical model and empirical results, respectively, pertaining to relative risk aversion in the context of mortality risk. The fourth section discusses results pertaining to speculative risk, and the article ends with a brief conclusion.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
For a concave utility function U defined over wealth of W, Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) suggested the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to wealth, or ( ) ( ) ( )
, as an appropriate measure of relative risk aversion. Ar--row showed that this measure is directly related to one's insistence on favorable odds when putting some fraction of wealth at risk, and Pratt demonstrated that R(W) is proportional to the insurance premium one is willing to pay to avoid a given risk. Both Pratt and Arrow hypothesized that R(W) increases with W; the hypothesis implies that at higher levels of wealth, individuals become less willing to subject a given percentage of wealth to risk. Subsequent empirical research has addressed three central questions: the magnitude of R(W), the IRRA hypothesis, and the relationship between risk aversion and demographic variables.
Among the earliest empirical estimates were those by Friend and Blume (1975) , who studied the demand for risky assets and concluded that R(W) generally exceeds unity and is probably greater than 2. Using expenditure data, Weber (1975) estimated R(W) to lie within a range from 1.3 to 1.8, and Szpiro (1986) obtained a similar range using aggregate time-series data on property insurance. In a careful study of consumption, Hansen and Singleton (1982) found relative risk aversion parameters ranging from 0.68 to 0.97. In a subsequent study of investments, Hansen and Singleton (1983) found numerous estimates of R(W), most of which ranged from 0.26 to 2.7, with outliers as low as -0.359 and as high as 58.25. Mankiw's (1985) study of consumption spending obtained relative risk aversion estimates ranging from 2.44 to 5.26 for nondurable consumption and from 1.79 to 3.21 for durable goods consumption.
The second question investigated in empirical work has been the IRRA hypothesis. Although theoretical applications typically assume either constant or increasing relative risk aversion, there has been no such consensus in the empirical literature, and the results appear highly sensitive to the measurement of wealth. Friend and Blume (1975) obtained mixed results indicative of either increasing or constant relative risk aversion. But Cohn et al. (1975) used a gross wealth measure that excluded liabilities and found a strong pattern of decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), judging by a cross-section of individual investors' portfolio choices. Siegel and Hoban (1982) replicated the Cohn et al. study using net worth and found that relative risk aversion is constant if housing is excluded from wealth. However, that result masked differences across subgroups: the least wealthy were found to exhibit IRRA, and the most wealthy exhibited DRRA. For broader measures of wealth, including housing and nonmarketable assets, they found IRRA among both subgroups. Similarly, Morin and Suarez (1983) found IRRA among the less wealthy and DRRA among the most wealthy. Szpiro (1983) initially found strong evidence of IRRA using aggregate cross-country data but was later unable to reject CRRA using time series data (Szpiro, 1986) . Bellanti and Saba (1986) replicated the Morin and Suarez study and found DRRA, and Levy (1994) found evidence of DRRA among students in an experimental study. Using insurance data, Eisenhauer and Halek (1999) found increasing absolute risk aversion, which implies IRRA.
The most recent research, from the late 1980s into the present, examines differences in risk aversion across demographic groups. As psychologist Marvin Zuckerman (1994, p. 123) notes, "Demographic differences suggest alternative hypotheses of explanation, some to do with social learning and some with biological-developmental tendencies." Beginning with the genetic basis, inherited differences in the brain's electrochemistry (specifically, differences in hormones, enzymes, and neurotransmitters) across genders and races are held to account for some differences in attitudes toward risk. Throughout life, hormonal changes caused by aging, exercise, depression, pregnancy, and nursing, as well as socialization and learning from events such as education, marriage, and parenting, and even personality changes induced by drug use or changes in the external environment can alter attitudes toward risk and show up in differences across demographic strata (the elderly, athletes, psychiatric patients, students, parents, spouses, alcoholics, and immigrants, as opposed to their respective counterparts). The sociobiological, or evolutionary, perspective suggests that primeage males, being better equipped to handle physical threats by virtue of strength, speed, agility, and endurance, have acquired a more risk-prone position than others in society by way of natural selection, for survival of the species. In a modern society largely bereft of prehistoric bodily dangers, these tendencies may manifest themselves in differential attitudes toward financial risks, sports, and other forms of risk (Trimpop, 1994) . And social psychologists emphasize cultural factors affecting attitudes. As Geis (1993, p. 12) explains, "According to social identity theory (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981) much of one's personal identity is derived from such social group memberships as one's nationality, ethnicity, religion, and occupation-as well as from one's sex. We adopt and internalize the norms, values, and attributes of our groups." Thus, for example, adherents of religions that proscribe gambling are less likely than others to engage in wagering, as they attempt to conform to the group's expectations. Both the natural and social sciences, then, theorize that attitudes toward risk differ across demographic lines.
An empirical comparison of males and females by Levin, Snyder, and Chapman (1988) asked 110 college students hypothetical questions regarding gambles and found women to be more risk averse. However, they also found that the phenomenon of "framing" matters-i.e., whether the question is posed in terms of potential gain or potential loss. Powell and Ansic (1997) likewise asked small samples of college students experimental questions regarding property insurance and foreign currency exchange and found women to be more risk averse. Theirs is one of the few studies to date to have included both pure and speculative forms of risk.
2
Using survey data on the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) found evidence of DRRA and found single women to be more risk averse than single men. Their results were invariant with respect to age and education, but the gender differences were affected by race and the presence of children. A similar study by Sunden and Surette (1998) found that marriage also interacts with gender in determining risk aversion. And experiments conducted by Schubert et al. (1999) found the gender differences affected by framing: females were more risk averse in gain-gambling, while males were more risk averse in loss-gambling.
Several other studies have gone beyond gender differences to look at additional demographic variables. Riley and Chow (1992) examined asset allocation decisions and found risk aversion to decline with wealth, education, and age, until age 65, at which time risk aversion increases. They also found risk aversion to be higher among females and nonwhites than among males and whites, respectively. Using a psychological questionnaire, Zuckerman (1994) found differences in risk aversion by age, gender, nationality, race, socioeconomic status, birth order, and marital status. And Hersch (1996) examined nonfinancial risk/safety decisions, including smoking, seat belt use, preventative healthcare, and preventative dental care. On this basis, she determined risk aversion to be higher among females, whites, the wealthy, and the better educated than among their respective counterparts. The study by Barsky et al. (1997) addressed all three research questions in a speculative risk context. Using answers to hypothetical survey questions, Barsky et al. estimated upper and lower bounds on relative risk aversion and its inverse, risk tolerance, and compared estimates across wealth and demographic variables. Applying strong assumptions including CRRA to the answers of four groups with different risk preferences, they obtained mean estimates of relative risk aversion ranging from 0.7 to 15.8, with an infinite upper bound. They found significant differences according to age, gender, race, religion, and nationality, as well as across behaviors such as smoking and drinking. And the cross-sections with the least wealth and the most wealth exhibited greater risk tolerance (or less risk aversion) than those with intermediate levels of wealth.
As this brief survey suggests, there is little consensus and few generalizations to be drawn from the existing literature regarding the magnitude of relative risk aversion, its behavior with respect to wealth, or its differences across demographic groups. The model and estimation below present a novel approach to the calculation of risk aversion parameters for individual households and a comparison of pure and speculative risk preferences. The latter helps to explain some of the inconsistent findings of previous research. For lack of a clearer alternative, the authors follow the customary terminology of the risk management literature (see, for example, the article by Williams, 1966, or the text by Trieschmann and Gustavson, 1998) in distinguishing "pure" risk from "speculative" risk. Pure risk, which we may also call "downside" risk, refers to a situation in which loss is possible but the most favorable outcome is the absence of loss-no gain is possible relative to the starting position. Speculative risk refers to a situation in which either gains or losses are possible.
MODEL
Consider a simple model of life insurance demand adapted from Eisenhauer and Halek (1999) .
A household's concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is given by U(W) such that ()0() UWUW << ′′′ . For simplicity, assume that the head of the household is the sole wage earner, and let Y represent the present value of expected future earnings, conditional on his or her survival. Y thus represents, in a sense, the value of the head of the household's human capital. There is a probability p of the breadwinner's death causing the loss of Y, and a complementary probability ( ) 1 p − of survival exists during the period in question. The household's accumulated stock of assets (A), excluding human capital, is not subject to the same risk as Y. Life insurance coverage of V is available at a premium rate, or per-dollar cost of coverage m, such that 01 m << . The premium rate reflects a markup over the probability of loss, so that mp l = , where l is the loading factor. The total premium for life insurance is mV and is paid regardless of the state of nature that prevails. If a death and consequent loss of Y occurs, the household recovers V in life insurance claims. Expected utility is therefore given by
This conventional, single-period model is adopted for convenience; because a rational, forward-looking household takes all known information into account in the initial purchase decision, the central results extend to multiple periods (see Campbell, 1980) .
The household chooses V to maximize expected utility, and this yields the first-order condition
(1)(*)(1)(**)
where * V denotes the optimal level of coverage. Expected, or average, wealth is then calculated as [](1)** EWApYmVpV =+−−+
and its variance is given by
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(1)(*)
Constructing a second-order Taylor series expansion of Equation (2) 
where * YV − represents the uninsured portion of potential loss, and
Because q relates the loading factor to the probability of survival, it may be inter--preted as a type of insurance pricing parameter. Indeed, taking the partial derivatives of Equations (3) and (4) with respect to V* and substituting into Equation (7) allows us to express
REW in terms of the marginal effects of insurance on the mean and variance of expected wealth:
Note that this expression is consistent with Pratt's (1964) observation that relative risk aversion is proportional to twice the risk premium that an individual demands per unit of variance, if he or she is to place a fraction of wealth at risk.
The authors' objective in the next section is to obtain explicit estimates of the relative risk aversion parameter by measuring Equation (7) for each household surveyed, and then to compare these estimates across demographic groups.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF RISK AVERSION
The authors estimate the model with 1992 survey data from Wave I of the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The survey consists of 12,652 individuals in 7,607 households. In particular, the authors examine households that had purchased term life insurance, either individually or through a group, on the primary respondent, whom they assume to be the head of the household. Because other forms of life insurance such as universal and whole life contain cash value savings components not accounted for in our model, these were excluded from the analysis.
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The total face value of all the term policies on the head of the household is our empirical measure of V* from the model above. The potential loss to the household (Y) resulting from the breadwinner's death was constructed by separating out the head's contribution to gross household income, deducting taxes using the Internal Revenue Service 1992 rate schedules, extending the net earnings over the reported number of 3 This should not bias the authors' results unless buyers of cash value policies differ systematically from buyers of term insurance. The authors also experimented with including households having no life insurance policies, i.e., those for whom *0 V = . For those households, however, Equation (7) provides only an upper bound of the true measure of relative risk aversion. In practice, including such households was of no statistical or practical significance for the empirical results.
DEMOGRAPHY OF RISK AVERSION 7
years to retirement, and discounting back to present value at an assumed rate of 2 percent.
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As a safeguard against underreported income or overinsurance, the authors included only households for whom the potential loss equaled or exceeded insurance coverage; in so doing, they restricted attention to risk-averse households.
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A mortality rate (p) for each primary respondent was derived by gender and age from actuarial tables in Bell, Wade, and Goss (1992) . Because of missing and inconsistent data on premiums, the authors computed a premium rate (m) for each policyholder as a function of mortality and insurance coverage, based on average rate schedules published by the Federal Trade Commission (1979). Their assets variable ( ) A measures net worth, including housing. After describing their findings pertaining to "pure" or "downside" risk, the authors will compare them to reported attitudes toward a situation of speculative risk.
Two brief examples will serve to illustrate the authors' calculations. One respondent, a 52-year-old married Hispanic male, had $113,000 in noncontingent assets (A), $504,968.50 in human capital (Y), and $278,000 in term life insurance (V*). His agebased mortality rate (p) was 0.007655, and his premium rate (m) This estimation procedure resulted in 2,376 household-level observations of the relative risk aversion parameter, with a mean of 3.735 and a standard deviation of 24.112. As Figure 1 indicates, however, the distribution is skewed and the average is raised by the presence of a few extremely large outliers 7 ; consequently, the mean and standard deviation are of somewhat less interest than the median value of 0.888 and the interquartile range, which runs from 0.54 to 1.831. On the whole, these results are broadly consistent with previous estimates, especially those of Singleton (1982, 1983) , as described above.
Multivariate regression analysis was performed to examine the potential effects of 4 For individuals not reporting an expected retirement date, the authors assumed retirement at age 65. This follows the Social Security Administration's assumption of the normal retirement age for this cohort. The authors also ran estimations based on low and high premium rate equations, but neither substantially altered the results. Because price inflation has been offset by productivity enhancements such as the widespread adoption of computers, premium rates and loading factors appear to have been relatively stable over the period in question.
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Eleven households, or less than one-half of 1 percent of the sample, had relative risk aversion measures in excess of 100, or more than four standard deviations above the mean. If these are removed, the mean of
REW becomes 2.44 with a standard deviation of 6.738. Upon investigation, however, the authors found no particular justification for their removal and consequently retained the outliers so as not to bias the results.
demographics, behavioral characteristics, employment status, and wealth on risk aversion. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the continuous variables used in the regression models as well as counts and percentages of the indicator variables. Similar to relative risk aversion, the distributions of the wealth variables are skewed. The mean of assets is $199,131 compared to its median of $96,000, and the mean of human capital is $225,607 compared to its median of $161,803. The average head of the household is approximately age 55 and has almost one year of education beyond high school. Indicator variable counts show that slightly more than half the sample is male, three-quarters of the sample is white, and almost three-quarters is married. All but 20 percent of the respondents have completed high school, and just over 65 percent of the sample is Protestant. Fewer than 1 percent of the respondents are age 65 or older, while 9 percent are self-employed and fewer than 2 percent are unemployed.
FIGURE 1
Distribution of Relative Risk Aversion Tables 2 and 3 present regression results of models used in this analysis. An initial regression and a backward elimination method based on a 10 percent significance level were run on two different models (Model 1 and Model 2) in both semi-log and full-log form. By "semi-log," the authors mean a regression model in which the natural log of the dependent variable is regressed on the independent variables. Conversely, by "full log," they mean a similar regression model except the natural log of all continuous independent variables is used. The full log model is also commonly known as the log-linear model or the log-log model.
cluded. Characteristics such as age, gender, race, religion, depression, unemployment, assets, and human capital may clearly affect one's level of risk aversion. All variables reflecting these traits were included in both Model 1 and Model 2. Since individuals have no real choice in most of these demographic characteristics, the possible causal relationship between them and risk aversion is self-evident. For example, everyone ages and everyone is born a certain gender and ethnicity. Many previous studies also suggest that risk aversion differs across gender, age, and wealth level.
The relationship between risk aversion and other characteristics such as education level, immigrant status, marriage status, children living at home, drinking habits, manager status, and self-employment is not as clear. While it can be argued that these traits may affect one's risk aversion, it may also be that one's risk aversion affects these lifestyle choices. For example, it may be argued that marriage increases one's risk aversion, but it may also be argued that more risk-averse individuals choose to marry. Consequently, these variables were included in Model 1 but were omitted from Model 2.
Results of the multivariate semi-log regressions are shown in Table 2 . The natural log of risk aversion was taken as the dependent variable to account for its highly skewed distribution. The squares of assets and human capital were included as independent variables to account for their nonlinear relationship with risk aversion. Also, given the multiple types of race and religion, the categorical variables Other (other race) and Otherrel (other religion) were omitted as independent variables causing the intercept term to reflect their effect on risk aversion. , Age65, Gender, Black, Hispanic, and the intercept were significant after the backward elimination method was applied to the initial regression. The authors will now interpret these coefficients of the semi-log regressions.
Contingent on the regression model, the coefficient of Age varies from -0.0472 to -0.0510, implying that a one-year increase in age tends to decrease one's risk aversion by 4.72 percent to 5.10 percent. However, based on the findings of Riley and Chow (1992) that risk aversion rises at age 65, the authors included an indicator for those respondents aged 65 or older. The coefficient of Age65 varies from 0.6688 to 0.7615, which suggests that being age 65 or older significantly increases one's risk aversion by 95.19 percent to 114.15 percent. 9 This is not to say that these older respondents necessarily carry more life insurance than younger ones. In fact, those under the age of 65 carry substantially larger amounts of coverage-approximately $22,500 more, on average, than those 65 and older. What matters for this analysis is the magnitude of the insurance coverage relative to other material factors, including mortality and potential earnings, hence the necessity of obtaining an explicit calculation of the risk aversion parameter. This illustrates a methodological difficulty with some previous studies, which simply examined a single behavior (such as holding risky assets or purchasing insurance) and then inferred differences in risk preferences across groups.
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Unlike the coefficient of a continuous independent variable in a semi-log or full-log regression, the interpretation of an indicator variable's parameter is not directly obvious. It is the exponential of the indicator variable's parameter that yields its marginal effect on the dependent variable. imply that for any fixed amount of change in assets, there is a positive percentage change in risk aversion that decreases in magni-tude as assets increase. At sufficiently high levels of assets, the percentage change in risk aversion becomes negative. For example, consider the coefficients of Assets and (Assets) 2 after backward elimination has been applied to Model 2. In this case, a $25,000 increase to an asset level of $100,000 would tend to increase one's risk aversion by 4.84 percent. However, this same $25,000 increase applied to an asset level of $1 million would tend to increase one's risk aversion by 3.82 percent. Also, applying this $25,000 increase to any asset level in excess of approximately $4,359,000 would tend to decrease one's level of risk aversion. Hence, the IRRA hypothesis appears to hold when wealth is measured in terms of net assets, at least until the higher asset values, at which point the data yield evidence of the DRRA hypothesis. This is consistent with the findings of Siegel and Hoban (1982) and Morin and Suarez (1983) .
On the other hand, the negative signs and values of the coefficients of Humcap and the positive signs and values of the coefficients of (Humcap) 2 imply that for any fixed amount of change in human capital, there is a negative percentage change in risk aversion that decreases in magnitude as human capital increases. At sufficiently high levels of human capital, the percentage change in risk aversion becomes positive. Again, consider the coefficients of Humcap and (Humcap) 2 after backward elimination has been applied to Model 2. Here, a $25,000 increase to a $100,000 level of human capital would tend to decrease one's risk aversion by 8.76 percent. The same $25,000 increase applied to a $1 million level of human capital would tend to decrease one's risk aversion by 4.81 percent. Finally, applying this $25,000 increase to any level of human capital in excess of approximately $2,095,000 would tend to increase one's level of risk aversion. Thus, when wealth is measured in terms of human capital, the DRRA hypothesis appears to hold up to some high level of human capital, at which point the IRRA hypothesis seems more plausible.
As suggested by most previous studies, the difference in risk aversion across genders is highly significant. The negative coefficients of Gender in Table 2 range from -0.6054 to -0.6956, which implies that in this study, men are less risk averse than women by 45.41 percent to 50.12 percent. Race also appears to affect risk aversion, as both blacks and Hispanics are consistently significantly less risk averse than whites and other races by approximately 13 percent to 16 percent. Three of the four regressions in Table 2 imply that blacks are slightly more risk averse than Hispanics by no more than 2.5 percent while one regression suggests Hispanics are 1.41 percent more risk averse than blacks. Whites are never significantly different from races other than blacks or Hispanics. A respondent's religious faith has little effect on risk aversion. After applying the backward elimination method to both Model 1 and Model 2, only the coefficient of Catholic in Model 1 is significant. This coefficient value of 0.0644 tells us that Catholicism marginally increases one's level of risk aversion by 6.65 percent compared to any of the other religions, which have no significant effect on risk aversion.
According to Model 1 of Table 2 , the p-values of Native, Married, and Selfemp indicate that these potentially causal independent variables are significant. The magnitude of their coefficients after backward elimination was applied suggests that immigrants have 13.95 percent lower risk aversion than natives on average, marriage increases risk aversion by 29.28 percent, and self-employment actually increases risk aversion by 24.92 percent, which is contrary to much of the literature on entrepreneurship.
This may be explained in part by the lack of access the self-employed have to other forms of insurance, such as unemployment insurance. Somewhat surprisingly, neither unemployment nor education corresponds to noticeable influences on risk aversion. The same is true of the self-reported health variable, Depress, and the behavioral variable, Drinker.
Finally, several diagnostic test statistics are worth mentioning regarding the semi-log regressions. First, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is displayed for each independent variable as a test of multicollinearity. While the VIFs of the race variables are borderline in the initial regressions of Model 1 and Model 2, they are sufficiently reduced in the backward elimination regressions. Second, the R 2 of approximately 47 percent for Model 1 and 46 percent for Model 2 indicates that almost half the variation of the natural log of risk aversion among respondents is explained. The full-log regression models provide more explanatory power as the R 2 increases to over 65 percent, while the VIFs behave analogously to those in Table 2 . The authors next discuss these full-log regression models displayed in Table 3 .
For the most part, the results of the full-log regressions are consistent with the semilog regression results. Again, in both Model 1 and Model 2, independent variables associated with age, wealth, and gender were significant after the backward elimination method was applied to initial regressions. In particular, the coefficient of Ln(Age) varies from -4.4775 to -4.5795, which implies that for a 1 percent increase in age, risk aversion decreases by 4.48 percent to 4.58 percent. Also, the coefficient of Age65 varies from 0.3091 to 0.3240, which suggests that being age 65 or older significantly increases one's risk aversion by 36.22 percent to 38.26 percent. While the magnitude of the effects of age on risk aversion differs slightly from the semi-log regressions, the directional effects are identical. The same is also true of the effect of wealth on risk aversion. The sign of Ln(Assets) is positive and the sign of Ln(Humcap) is negative. The coefficients of the former range from 0.3488 to 0.3640 and from -0.8896 to -0.9165 for the latter. This translates to an inelastic effect of wealth on risk aversion. For example, a 10 percent increase in assets tends to increase risk aversion by only about 3.5 percent, and a 10 percent increase in human capital tends to decrease risk aversion by about 9 percent. Once again the IRRA hypothesis is supported if wealth is measured in assets, while the DRRA hypothesis is supported if wealth is measured in human capital. Lastly, the negative coefficients of Gender in Table 3 reinforce the notion that men are less risk averse than women in this study, but by not as much as Table 2 infers.
Race and religion appear to affect risk aversion, but in a different manner than the semi-log regressions indicated. First, both blacks and Hispanics are significantly less risk averse than whites and other races only after backward elimination was applied to Model 1. Both blacks and Hispanics are significantly less risk averse than whites and other races in Model 2. Here, the only religion that appears to affect risk aversion is not Catholicism, but Judaism. In Model 2, the coefficients of Jewish imply that Judaism increases risk aversion by 20.97 percent to 23.55 percent.
Last of all, the Model 1 full-log regressions show that again self-employment significantly affects risk aversion, but unlike the prior semi-log regressions suggested, marriage and native status do not influence risk aversion, but a respondent's level of education does. The magnitude of the Selfemp and Ln(Educ) coefficients, after backward elimination was applied, suggests that self-employment increases risk aversion by 31.80 percent and a 10 percent increase in education increases risk aversion by 2.35 percent. Notes: Obs. = 2,244. One hundred thirty-two observations were removed because they had no human capital. Model 1 includes all potentially causal independent variables. Model 2 includes only strictly causal independent variables. The dependent variable in both models is the natural log of relative risk aversion. The p-values are based on a two-tailed test that the true coefficient is zero. 
Notes: Obs.=2,244. One hundred thirty-two observations were removed because they had no human capital. Model 1 includes all potentially causal independent variables. Model 2 includes only strictly causal independent variables. N/A (not available) refers to variables included in Model 1 but not Model 2. The dependent variable in both models is the natural log of relative risk aversion. The p-values are based on a two-tailed test that the true coefficient is zero.
SPECULATIVE RISK
The HRS survey also questioned respondents regarding their willingness to accept a new job with a 50 percent chance of doubling their current household income and a 50 percent chance of reducing it by one-third. This is one of the questions on which Barsky et al. (1997) relied for their analysis of risk tolerance. Although it is a hypo-thetical question, the responses to which must be viewed with some caution, it provides a convenient method of comparing the authors' analysis of pure risk aversion with attitudes toward speculative risk-taking. Because the question presents a favorable gamble with an expected income one-third higher than current income, one need not be risk loving to accept it. Because the question was asked of all respondents and relatively few observations were missing, the authors were able to include nearly all primary respondents, or heads of households, in this comparison, rather than only those with term life insurance. This sample therefore consists of 7,312 heads of households, of whom 23.78 percent were willing to accept the income gamble as preferable to their current income.
For comparative purposes, the authors examined the same demographic variables as in the prior section; descriptive statistics for the continuous and binary variables are provided in Table 4 . Despite the differences in samples, the means, medians, and standard deviations of the age, education, and assets variables are comparable to those among the group of insureds studied above. Only the human capital variable is noticeably different; as one might expect, human capital is higher among the insured cohort than among the broader population. Similarly, the indicator variables suggest that the two samples are comparable in most respects, with a few notable exceptions: there are greater proportions of senior citizens, Hispanics, and the self-employed and smaller proportions of high-school graduates among the broad sample than among the insured.
To assess the effects of these demographic factors on the likelihood of accepting the risk of the proposed employment change, the authors performed binary logistic regression using the dependent variable Gamble, which takes the value one if the respondent accepted the hypothetical risk, and zero otherwise.
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The authors again used two models (Model 1 and Model 2), the first of which included all potentially causal independent variables, and the second of which included only those the authors considered exogenous, nonbehavioral characteristics, and, thus, clearly causal. The results are given in Table 5 .
Note first that because this regression seeks to explain speculative risk-taking whereas the earlier analysis explored aversion to pure risk, the coefficients in Table 5 would be of opposite sign to those in Tables 2 and 3 if the responses to both types of risk were symmetric-i.e., if the context of risk made no difference. 11, 12 Although this does occur in some cases, it appears that more generally, context does matter. For example, 10 This approach is in contrast to that of Barsky et al. (1997) , who applied univariate analysis, rather than multivariate analysis, to several such hypothetical survey questions.
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Of course, if the dependent binary variable had been assigned the value one when the respondent refused the gamble and zero when the respondent accepted the gamble, then identical signs of coefficients in Tables 2, 3 , and 5 would infer consistent aversion to both forms of risk.
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In their logistic regression analysis, the authors focus on the signs of the regressor coefficients rather than their numerical estimates when comparing the potential impacts of the demographic variables to those of the prior section. Because logistic regression is nonlinear, the value of an estimated coefficient does not solely reflect the direct marginal effect of the corresponding independent variable; it must first be multiplied by F (1 -F) where F is the value of the logistic cumulative distribution function evaluated for a particular set of independent variables. Thus, the marginal effect is a linear function of the coefficient but also varies with the values of all the other regressors. in the previous section the authors found that men are less risk averse and men are more inclined to take speculative risks than women. On the other hand, the authors found that Catholics and Jews are more averse than members of other faiths to pure risk, yet at the same time they are more tolerant of speculative risk. The latter finding may reflect differences in religious teachings regarding gambling in general; whereas some Protestant denominations view gambling as sinful, many Catholic parishes employ games of chance to raise funds for church use.
TABLE 5
Logistic Regression Analysis The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates. The p-values of the coefficients are based on the Wald chi-squared test statistic, which is the square of the coefficient divided by its estimated standard error. The "-2 Log L" statistic has a chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis that all independent variables are zero.
As one might expect, acceptance of the proposed income gamble declines significantly with age. It is interesting to note, moreover, that if the proposal is interpreted as a permanent change in income as opposed to a temporary change, then, ceteris paribus, much larger dollar amounts are at stake for the younger respondents, who have more years of earnings ahead of them, than for older respondents, who are closer to retirement. Thus, the younger respondents demonstrate greater tolerance for a relatively large risk, while older respondents display greater reluctance to accept a relatively small gamble; hence the difference in risk tolerance may be even greater than suggested by a cursory inspection of Table 5 .
Consistent with the authors' pure risk results, speculative risk-taking appears to be significantly lower among married heads of households than among the unmarried respondents. Curiously, however, those with children at home appear somewhat more inclined to accept the income gamble than those without children. These findings may reflect a self-selection process, in which those who are most risk averse are more inclined toward marriage and less inclined to have children in the first place. Inasmuch as this potentially reverses the direction of causality, marital and parental status are both removed from Model 2 in Table 5 .
The results pertaining to nationality and race are for the most part consistent with the authors' findings for pure risk. As anticipated, natives were far less likely to accept the speculative income gamble than immigrants. Among those who had left their homeland in search of better opportunities, more than 30 percent would accept an income gamble with a favorable expected outcome, while the proportion is only 23 percent among natives, and holding other factors constant, the effect of nationality is significant at the 2 percent level. Here again, because the degree of risk tolerance may affect the likelihood of migration, this variable is removed from the second model. The authors do find, however, that the Hispanic population, from whom many of the immigrants are drawn, is significantly more willing to take the proposed gamble than either whites or blacks.
From the two education variables (Grad and Educ), the authors find that risk-taking is lower among high-school graduates and college attendees than among dropouts, but at the margin, risk-taking rises with years of education. Again, however, the direction of causation is unclear. One possibility is that education affects the propensity to take risk. Alternatively, it may be that the degree of risk tolerance affects one's decision to leave or stay in school. Moreover, if risk aversion affects educational attainment, it is not clear whether this is because of self-selection or whether risk aversion affects educational performance. This suggests an intriguing topic for further research.
Whereas relative risk aversion in the pure risk model is not significantly affected by unemployment, the authors find that the unemployed are significantly more likely to accept the proposed income gamble. This is undoubtedly related to a feeling among the unemployed that they have little at stake in the proposed gamble, being already in a state of economic loss. Among the employed, the authors find no significant difference between managers and nonmanagerial employees in terms of risk-taking; nor do the authors find that the self-employed exhibit a significantly different level of risk tolerance than others. The latter finding is somewhat curious in that the selfemployed, like immigrants, have already demonstrated a willingness to accept an income gamble by virtue of starting their own business. It may well be the case that, having already accepted that initial level of income risk, the self-employed are no more tolerant of further speculative risk than other respondents. Table 5 considers the effects of both wealth variables: human capital and noncontingent assets. The Assets variable shows no significant effect on the likelihood of accepting the proposed gamble. But the effect of human capital on speculative risk-taking is nonlinear and statistically significant. In particular, risk-taking appears to be parabolic in human capital, initially falling but eventually rising as human capital increases. Rather remarkably, this is the same pattern demonstrated by risk aversion in Table 2 , providing further evidence that individuals are not indifferent to the context or type of risk they face.
Finally, to determine whether speculative risk-taking is related to pure risk aversion, the authors compared the estimates of R(E [W] ) to the value of Gamble for each household on which the data were available. Figure 2 compares the cumulative density functions across the following two groups: those who refused the proposed gamble (non-risk-takers), and those who accepted (risk-takers). As one might expect, greater proportions of risk-takers are concentrated at low levels of risk aversion; R(E[W]) = 0.5, for example, is the 20th percentile among non-risk-takers, but 25 percent of risktakers have relative risk aversion measures of 0.5 or less. At best, this comparison implies again that individuals may not be indifferent to the type of risk they face. However, a chi-square test comparing the two distributions yields a test statistic of 10.4123 with nine degrees of freedom (p-value of 0.3182). Hence, the differences in relative risk aversion between the two groups are not statistically significant.
FIGURE 2
Comparison of Relative Risk Aversion Between Non-Risk-Takers and Risk-Takers
CONCLUSION
This study examines attitudes to both pure and speculative risks across various segments of the population. Some of the authors' results are completely intuitive and in agreement with earlier studies. The authors find, for example, that those who have already demonstrated a willingness to engage in risk-taking by migrating across national borders are significantly less averse than natives to both pure and speculative risks. Similarly, those who are currently unemployed exhibit a significantly greater willingness than others to gamble their current income for the chance to double it. And for both pure and speculative risks the authors find, as did previous research, that women are significantly more risk averse than men.
Other results are more complex and may tell us as much about the different types of risk as about the demographic subgroups. The authors find, for example, that the self-employed are not significantly different from others in their attitudes toward speculative risks, yet they are significantly more averse to downside risks than those employed by others. Similarly, the authors find that at the margin, education increases one's aversion to pure risk but also increases the willingness to accept a speculative risk. This may relate to a desire to control one's environment: generally, one must actively seek out speculative risks, whereas one reacts to the pure risks that are effectively thrust upon him or her.
At the same time, the authors' understanding of the causal relationship between risk aversion and personal characteristics remains somewhat cautious. To the extent that the authors obtain significant relationships, it is clear that purely demographic variables such as age, gender, and race affect an individual's degree of risk aversion.
Similarly, it appears likely that differences in religious beliefs affect attitudes toward risk-taking, rather than vice versa. Elsewhere, the direction of causality is difficult to ascertain. The decision to drink alcohol, for example, may result from a relatively low degree of risk aversion, or the consumption of alcohol itself may reduce the degree of risk aversion. And while we find statistically significant relationships between risk aversion and marriage, it would be premature at present to infer the direction of causality.
The study also touches on the relationship between risk aversion and wealth. We find speculative risk taking to be parabolic in human capital but unaffected by nonhuman assets. For pure risks, by contrast, the authors find the Pratt-Arrow measure of relative risk aversion to be parabolic in both components of wealth: initially increasing and then decreasing in noncontingent assets, and initially decreasing and later increasing in human capital.
While the authors have determined that the distinction between pure and speculative risks is crucial in understanding risk aversion, this empirical analysis begs the question of why attitudes toward risk should differ by risk type. The authors have made no attempt to address that issue here and leave it for future research.
